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Much of the research that has examined abortion in its 
economic context has focused on measuring abortion demand, 
the role that economic costs, like those imposed by 
abortion regulation, and demographics play in a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy. Another aspect of the
abortion decision amenable to economic analysis is when a 
woman has her procedure. The National Abortion Federation 
argues that abortion regulations, in addition to deterring
abortion regulations altogether, also cause a woman who
does elect abortion to delay when she actually has it, a 
problematic effect given that the later in a pregnancy an 
abortion is performed, the greater the medical risk.
This issue was examined using the economic theory of 
fertility, which argues that the decision to have an 
abortion is made by weighing the costs and benefits of 
having an abortion versus having a child. It is 
hypothesized here that making this decision takes a certain 
amount of time ; the time is determined by both how long it 
takes to gather the information on the costs of abortion 
and having the child as well as the degree of difference 
between these costs.
Using a logit model, this study estimated the 
probability that a woman defers her abortion past the 12^̂  
week LMP based on a set of economic and sociological 
factors. In the analysis, all the coefficients for the 
economic variables were insignificant, implying that their 
impact on abortion timing is minimal. The three 
significant results, TEEN, COLLEGEl, and PREVAB, all 
represented characteristics that illustrate a woman's 
ability to gather the relevant abortion information.
In terms of the abortion timing hypothesis, it appears that 
what determines when a woman has her abortion is not the 
set of economic costs she faces but her ability to learn 
about such costs. What this suggests about state 
regulations that impose, at the very least, a time cost is 
that they are unlikely to lead women to defer when they 
have the procedure. However, given that a Mississippi 
study indicates that regulations do result in deferral, the 
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Twenty-seven years ago, Roe v. Wade recognized a 
woman's right to an abortion based on the notion of the 
"trimester f r a m e w o r k . W i t h i n  this framework, states were 
restricted from regulating first-trimester abortions, but 
were allowed to regulate abortions in the later months of 
pregnancy.̂
In response to this ruling, individual states began 
regulating abortion in ways believed to be permissible 
under Roe v . Wade; one such state was Pennsylvania. Prior 
to 1991, Pennsylvania had three abortion regulations in 
place, informed consent, spousal notification, and parental 
consent.
Pennsylvania's informed consent statute mandated that, 
at least 24 hours prior to performing the abortion, a 
physician provide a woman necessary medical information
 ̂ See Appendix A for a comprehensive history of Supreme Court 
decisions on reproductive issues.
 ̂ Emanuel (1998-99) provides an overview of reproductive 
constitutional law in the United States.
about the procedure and the estimated gestational age of 
the fetus. It also required an abortion provider or a 
qualified abortion staff to provide a woman information on 
non-abortion alternatives, such as adoption and available 
financial services. Pennsylvania's spousal notification 
provision required a married woman to sign a document 
stating that she had notified her husband of her pending 
abortion.̂  Finally, the state's parental consent law 
required either parent of a young woman under 18 to provide 
informed consent in order for the teenager to have an 
abortion.^
In 1991, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania contested Pennsylvania's three abortion 
regulations on the basis that they violated Roe v. Wade.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case upheld most of 
Pennsylvania's regulations and, in fact, overruled the 
"trimester framework." States were then allowed to impose 
abortion regulations in the first trimester so long as such 
laws did not place an "undue burden" on a woman's ability 
to choose to have an abortion.
 ̂ This law included exceptions for both women whose pregnancy was 
the result of sexual assault and for women who believed that 
notifying their husbands would result in physical abuse.
 ̂ The provision allowed for a "judicial bypass," by which a court 
could authorize a young woman's abortion without her parent's 
informed consent.
What constitutes an undue burden on a woman's right to 
abort is certainly a litigious issue in the already 
contentious abortion debate. Yet, in Penn. V. Casey, the 
Supreme Court gave clear examples of what they did and did 
not consider an undue burden. For example, they ruled that 
Pennsylvania's spousal notification law did impose an undue 
restriction and overturned the decision on the basis that 
it neglected to protect a woman who would potentially face 
psychological abuse, rather than physical abuse, by 
notifying her spouse. On the other hand, the Court found 
that both the parental consent and informed consent 
statutes did not present an undue burden and, thus, upheld 
these provisions.̂
Economists are studying the effects of state abortion 
regulations by treating them as though they imposed an 
economic cost and conducting demand analysis. These 
economic studies assess whether or not a woman is deterred 
by either the costs associated with abortion laws and/or 
other economic costs of abortion.
 ̂ Appendix B provides the current status of all state mandatory 
delay, informed consent, and parental consent laws as well as 
present Medicaid funding restrictions. Appendix C provides 
Montana's current status of all abortion regulations. Currently, 
Montana does not impose either a parental consent or mandatory 
waiting period restriction. Also, Montana does not restrict 
their use of state Medicaid funds to pay for abortions.
While consumer demand theory is useful in studying a 
woman's abortion decision, it is not limited to just the 
study of whether or not a woman has the procedure. It can 
also be used to study the effect of state regulations on 
the timing of abortion.
The National Abortion Federation (NAP) argues that 
state regulations like Pennsylvania's parental consent and 
2 4 hour informed consent laws affect women who have 
abortions by deferring when they have them.^ In other 
words, they argue these laws may cause a woman to have a 
late abortion. If this is so, the laws that were designed 
to lessen the number of abortions are, ironically, also 
increasing the gestational age of some terminated 
pregnancies.
What is undesirable about this possible effect of 
state abortion laws is that the medical risk and physical 
pain associated with abortion increases as the gestational 
age increases. Through most of the first trimester, 
abortion procedures are considered relatively safe and 
uncomplicated.̂  However, as a pregnancy nears the end of 
the first trimester, at around 13 weeks, abortion becomes
 ̂ This statement was obtained from the National Abortion 
Federation website www.prochoice.org/facts/afterl2w.html on June 
15, 2000.
 ̂ See Gold ( 1990) .
more problematic. Specifically, the risk of serious 
abortion complications increases as abortions are performed 
in the second trimester. These complications include 
infection; uterine perforation; cervical laceration; 
hemorrhaging; a missed abortion or "continued pregnancy;" 
postabortal syndrome^; and deatĥ '̂ *̂ .
Do economic factors, including the costs imposed by 
state regulation, place a woman at greater medical risk by 
deferring when she has her abortion? This thesis will 
address this question by using consumer demand theory, the 
same theory used to determine whether or not a woman has an 
abortion at all, to determine the impact of economic 
factors on the timing of the abortion decision.
This study will focus on women who had abortions in 
Missoula, Montana. The reason for choosing this locale is 
that Blue Mountain Clinic (BMC), a Missoula based family 
practice clinic that provides abortion services, has made 
survey data of their abortion clients available to this 
study.
® Postabortal syndrome happens when the uterus does not properly 
contract, preventing blood from leaving the uterus after the 
abortion procedure.
 ̂ The Alan Guttmacher Institute reports that the risk of death 
associated with abortion increases with the length of pregnancy, 
from 1 death for every 530,000 abortions at 8 or fewer weeks to 1 
per 17,000 at 16-20 weeks and 1 per 6,000 at 21 or more weeks.
See website www.agi-usa.org.
See The New Our Bodies, Ourselves (1992).
This study cannot directly assess the impact of 
abortion restrictions on abortion timing due to the 
limitations of the data. However, it is possible to infer
how a woman behaves when facing the costs imposed by 
abortion regulation by looking at her response to other 
economic costs. This study will indirectly measure the 
impact of regulation by treating regulation as another cost 
associated with abortion services.
Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two 
reviews sociological and economic studies to build the 
economic logic of the decision when to have an abortion. 
Chapter Three describes the data and statistical model used 
to study abortion timing. Chapter Four presents results 
and discusses the economic and policy implications of these 
figures. Chapter Five summarizes the findings and includes 
suggestions for further research on the economics of 
abortion timing.
In order to directly assess the effects of abortion regulations 
on abortion timing, the data must be either multi-state, with 
which a comparison study of regulatory and non-regulatory states 
can be conducted, or time-series, with which an analysis of a 
state that has changed its abortion policies can be done.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The hypothesis that economic variables affect when a 
woman terminates her pregnancy does not readily follow from 
consumer demand analysis and, thus, is not derived from an 
established economic model. However, by applying previous 
economic and sociological studies on abortion, a 
theoretical framework with which to study abortion timing 
can be developed.
This chapter first presents data on abortion trends in 
the United States, trends whose causes both economic and 
sociological researchers have been working to identify. 
Secondly, previous abortion demand studies will be 
described in order to provide the theoretical context with 
which to study abortion timing. Next, this chapter 
describes a sociological study that includes an analysis of 
the impact of restrictive laws on abortion timing. With 
these descriptions of previous abortion research in mind, 
the remaining portion of this chapter will develop how to
logically model the economic determinants of abortion 
timing.
Abortion Trends
An important reason analysts study abortion, in both 
economic and sociological terms, is that while abortion 
legislation has become more cumbersome, the number of 
reported abortions has noticeably decreased. According to 
Henshaw (1998), abortion rates (abortions per 1,000 women 
aged 15-44 per year) gradually climbed from 16.3 in 1973 to 
29.3 in 1981 and then steadily declined to almost 23 by 
1996. Changes in abortion ratios (abortions per 100 
pregnancies per year ending in abortion or live birth) were 
similar, ranging from 19.3 in 1973, up to approximately 30 
in the early 1980^s, and back down to 26.1 in 1996. See 
Table 2.1.
This pattern in abortion trends, from increasing once 
Roe V. Wade was decided to eventually decreasing has led 
economists to study what determines the decision to have an 
abortion. Have federal and state regulations affected the 
number of abortions? Do these trends reflect a woman's 
increasing participation in the work force? Economists 
interested in these questions have conducted abortion 
demand analyses, which essentially estimate the impact of
various economic and sociological factors on abortion
rates.
TABLE 2.1.
NUMBER OF REPORTED ABORTIONS 
RATE*, AND ABORTION RATIO**,
(in Thousands), ABORTION 
UNITED STATES, 1973-96 12
Year Abortions Rate Ratio
1973 744 . 6 16.3 19.3
1974 898.6 19.3 22 . 0
1975 1,034.2 21.7 24 . 9
1976 1,179.3 24.2 26.5
1977 1,316.7 26.4 28.6
1978 1,409 . 6 27.7 29.2
1979 1,497 . 7 28.8 29 . 6
1980 1, 553 .9 29 . 3 30.0
1981 1, 577 .3 29 . 3 30.1
1982 1,573.9 28 . 8 30.0
1983 1,575 . 0 28 . 5 30.4
1984 1,577.2 28.1 29.7
1985 1, 588 . 6 28.0 29.7
1986 1,574.0 27 . 4 29.4
1987 1,559.1 26.9 28.8
1988 1,590.8 27.3 28. 6
1989 1, 566 . 9 26.8 27.5
1990 1, 608 . 6 27 . 4 28. 0
1991 1,556.5 26.3 27.4
1992 1,528.9 25.9 27 . 5
1993 1,500.0 25.4 27.4
1994 1,431.0 24 . 1 26.7
1995 1,363 .7 22 . 9 26 . 0
1996 1,365.7 22 . 9 26.1
indicate a]bortions per 1000 women aged 15-44 and
abortions per 100 pregnancies ending in abortion or live- 
birth, respectively.
This data was taken from Henshaw (1995-96).
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Abortion Demand 
When economists began examining the effects of both 
abortion policy and other economic costs on abortion rates, 
economic fertility analysis was already well established. 
Robinson (1997) states that the economic theory of 
fertility had been developed and applied to the growing 
volumes of population and contraceptive use survey data 
that previously served only as the source of descriptive 
statistics. In other words, demography and other studies 
that focused on fertility were we11-developed empirical 
disciplines but lacked any theoretical framework.
Economics provided this framework by treating fertility as 
a result of rational decision making, incorporating 
fertility decisions into consumer demand theory.
According to Robinson, Harvey Leibenstein, in 1957, 
first articulated the economic theory of fertility by 
applying cost-benefit analysis, focusing on the decision 
making process of fertility at the margin. There, a couple 
rationally chooses whether or not to have another child by 
weighing the expected utilities and distutilities.
Later, Gary Becker brought Leibenstein's work into the 
household production function framework, where the 
household itself produces its own utility with internal 
resources, known as "household technology" and external, or
11
purchased, resources. Children, then, are the product of 
this "household technology," a special type of "capital 
good" who require initial and periodic maintenance 
expenditures. Children produce chiId-services over time, 
who provide utility for parents. As with Leibenstein, 
parents weigh the utility of the child's "production" 
against its disutility, or costs, when making their 
reproductive decision. If costs exceed benefits, fertility 
control is used. One such method of fertility control is 
abortion.
The typical demand model of abortion services 
incorporates price, income, demographic factors which 
represent consumer preferences, and public policy 
constraints. Coelen and McIntyre conducted one of the 
first such studies in 1973 by analyzing abortion policy 
effects on Hungary's abortion rates. Three years after Roe 
V. Wade, Deyak and Smith did a similar analysis in the 
United States.
This chapter describes in detail two abortion demand 
studies, conducted by Medoff (1988) and Garbacz (1990). 
These analyses are the best examples available of abortion
Other fertility control options include contraception and 
adoption.
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demand studies using fairly current data and reflecting the 
experience of the United States after Roe v. Wade in 1973.
Using regression analysis, Medoff estimates an
equation of the form:
A i = So + S iP i  + S2Y i  + SoSN G Li + S ^ L F P i + S5 C A T H i + SgWi + S7M1
+ Ui
The dependent variable is the number of abortions per 
1,000 pregnancies for each state in 1980.
P is the price of abortions. Its coefficient Si can be 
used to assess the impact that prohibiting abortion would 
have on the abortion demand. Medoff argues that because 
abortion is not fundamentally different from other goods 
and services, the law of demand will apply to abortion; 
making it illegal would dramatically raise the service's 
price and decrease the abortion rate. In the estimation, P 
is measured by the average price of an abortion in 
nonhospital facilities performed in the first trimester in 
each state.
Income (Y), which reflects the budget constraint, is 
the average income in each state of women fifteen to forty- 
four years old.
A woman's marital status (SNGL) is relevant to the 
abortion decision because, for a single woman, the costs of
13
an additional child are much higher than for a married 
woman. Married women, presumably, have the advantage of 
shared household responsibilities with their spouse, 
lessening the costs of caring for an additional child.
SNGL is the percentage of women aged fifteen to forty-four 
in each state who are unmarried and is argued to have a 
positive effect on the abortion rate.
The female labor force participation rate (LFP) shows 
the likelihood that a woman would be earning wages she 
would have to give up if she had a child. Women who are 
working are expected to have a higher demand for abortions. 
LFP is the labor force participation rate for each state 
for women 15-44. S4, the coefficient on LFP, is predicted
to be positive.
Medoff argues that demographic factors influence 
consumer preferences. One such factor is religion. The 
Roman Catholic Church unambiguously disapproves of 
abortions. Being Catholic increases the psychological cost 
to a woman of obtaining an abortion and, therefore.
This particular opportunity cost seems to be a contentious 
issue within feminist economics. Considering that many women 
simultaneously work and raise children, it seems outdated to 
interpret a woman's wages as something they would give up to have 
children. On the other hand, women are both participating 
relatively more in the labor force and having relatively fewer 
children, a seemingly negative correlation.
14
decreases demand. The CATH variable is the percentage of 
Catholic population in each state.
Another difference that is relevant to the abortion 
decision is liberal convictions. Medoff states that most 
fertility studies assume constant tastes across 
populations. However, he asserts that states in the Far 
West (California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Arizona and 
Hawaii) are more liberal than other states in terms of 
social stability and social norms. Thus, W is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for states of the far West and is 
expected to have a positive effect on the abortion rate.
M is a dummy variable that equals one for states that 
provided Medicaid funding for poor women who sought 
abortions in 1988, the study year. Its impact is predicted 
to be positive given that women who receive state funding 
do not face the same costs as women who live in states that 
do not provide Medicaid insurance for abortions. U is the 
error term.
Medoff examines two policies in his abortion demand 
analysis, the overall constitutional prohibition of 
abortion and the cessation of Medicaid funded abortions.
On the contrary, Arizona is arguably a politically conservative 
state.
In 1996, the Hyde Amendment barred federal funding of abortions 
using Medicaid funds. In 1997, a revised Hyde Amendment allowed 
states to deny the use of Medicaid funds for abortions.
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Medoff found that other things equal, in Medicaid states, 
women would have, on average, forty-four more abortions per 
thousand pregnancies than in states that do not provide 
public funding. In other words, states that eliminated 
Medicaid funding would have seen a 17.5% decrease in their 
1980 abortion rates. Also, he found a significant negative 
relationship between price and abortion. Demand was 
inelastic at -.81.^^ Medoff argues that if, for example, 
the illegal price of abortion was 50% higher than the 
prevailing market price, making abortion illegal would 
decrease the abortion rate 40.5%, holding all else 
constant.
Other results from the study were that the percent 
single and percent in the labor force were both found 
significantly positive; women in western states have 
eighteen more abortions per thousand pregnancies, ceteris 
parebus; income was significantly positive with an 
elasticity of .71; and a state's Catholic population had 
little effect on the demand for abortions.
Elasticities for this study were calculated at the mean.
Estimating that the price of abortion would increase by 50% 
seems to underestimate the total increase in costs that women 
would face if abortion was not legal. Not only would the price 
of an illegal abortion be higher, women would face the risk of 
going to jail, increased medical risks, and the emotional stress 
of not having abortion readily available.
16
Garbacz's abortion demand study is useful because he 
attempts to determine if teenagers behave differently than 
adult women in the abortion decision. He does this by 
running regressions for the total reproductive age group as 
well for separate age groups 15-17, 15-19, and 20-44. His
equation for the total reproductive age group is of the 
form:
T O T A L  Ê o P R IC E i + i^ iIN C O M E i + E g M E D IC A ID i + EsURBANi + 
S4BLACKi + iSsGALLUPi + SeED + E v S IT E i + U i
The dependent variable is the abortion rate per 
thousand pregnancies for each state (TOTAL) in 1982. For 
the overall 15-44 age group, data was available from all 
states. For the individual age groups, data was available 
from 37 states.
Garbacz"s price variable (PRICE) is the average price 
in each state of an abortion using a local anesthetic, in 
nonhospital facilities, and performed the first ten weeks. 
Garbacz expects, like Medoff, that the abortion rate and 
price will have a negative relationship. However, he 
recognizes that the price variation between states is not 
very large^^.^° Income (INCOME) is the disposable personal
19
2 The standard deviation is 10.9% of the mean. ° Medoff did not address this price variation.
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income per capita in each state for 1982. This measure is 
different from Medoff's, which was women's, rather than per 
capita, income.
Unlike Medoff, Garbacz includes a variable for travel 
cost, which addresses the relevant problem that many women 
do not have adequate access to abortion services. Women 
who travel long distances have relatively higher costs 
associated with having an abortion than women who live 
close to an abortion provider. Garbacz's variable SITE 
represents the travel cost for women residing in rural 
areas. It is the number of abortion sites per million 
population of reproductive age that are located in rural 
areas of each state.
URBAN is the percentage of the population in each 
state that resides in an urban area. Garbacz argues the 
importance of including an urban variable (URBAN) in the 
model to measure access to abortion services. Yet, urban 
areas may also capture Medicaid effects because most states 
that are relatively more urban are more likely to provide 
Medicaid coverage. He attempts to identify these effects 
separately by comparing regressions in which both MEDICAID
Garbacz notes this difference but does not explain it.
Urban areas may also capture the effects of Garbacz's SITE 
variable. Presumably, women who live in urban areas have better 
access to abortion providers than women in rural areas, which is 
what Garbacz intended for SITE to measure.
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and URBAN and only MEDICAID, without URBAN, are included. 
MEDICAID is a dummy variable for states that provide 
funding for abortions. The coefficients on both URBAN and 
MEDICAID are hypothesized to be positive.
Instead of the female labor force participation rate, 
Garbacz uses education (ED) to represent the opportunity 
cost of having a child. ED is the percentage of the 
population twenty-five years or older that had earned a 
high school degree or GED.
Garbacz's specification of demographic variables 
reflecting preferences is slightly different than Medoff's, 
Instead of a Far West variable for liberal taste, he 
includes an attitudinal measure from the GALLUP Poll 
(GALLUP), which is the percentage of the population from 
four census regions that support Roe v. Wade.
Because black women have a greater abortion rate than 
white women, Garbacz includes the variable BLACK, the 
percentage of women of child-bearing age who are black in 
each state. He expects the effect to be positive for 
adults and negative for teenagers. U is the random 
variable.
However, white teenagers have 1.45 the abortion rate of black 
teenagers.
19
For the overall age group, Garbacz"s price and income 
coefficients were found to be statistically significant 
with elasticities of -.68 and ,84, quite similar to 
Medoff 's.^^
In the model that includes all ages, both URBAN and 
SITE were found positive and statistically significant. As 
opposed to Medoff's analysis, MEDICAID was not found to be 
statistically significant. Yet, when URBAN is dropped from 
the model, MEDICAID has almost the same elasticity as in 
Medoff's. This suggests that the true effect MEDICAID has 
on the abortion rate is unknown, leaving the issue of 
Medoff's significant MEDICAID variable unresolved.
For the model that includes all ages and both URBAN 
and MEDICAID, BLACK, GALLUP, and ED are not found to be 
significant. Garbacz finds that BLACK is both negative and 
significant for teenagers. Neither URBAN nor GALLUP have a 
significant effect on teenage abortion rates.
Abortion Timing
Both Medoff's and Garbacz's abortion demand models are 
examples of how abortion trends are being studied by 
economists. No comparable economic research has been
24 Garbacz's elasticities are also calculated at the mean.
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conducted on the timing of abortion. Sociologists, 
however, have addressed this pertinent issue.
While examining the effects of state mandatory delay 
laws on abortion trends, Althaus and Henshaw (1994) studied 
both abortion rates for women in Mississippi and 
gestational ages at the time of abortion. Mississippi's 
mandatory delay law went into effect in August 1992. It 
requires that a woman receive, in person, information on 
abortion 24 hours before her scheduled procedure. This 
includes the name of the abortion provider; the medical 
risks associated with abortion; the estimated gestational 
age of the fetus; the medical risks of carrying the 
pregnancy to term; and the financial options made available 
to women who decide against abortion. Because the law 
mandates that women must receive this information in 
person, it requires two visits to the provider clinic.
Althaus and Henshaw acquired their data from the 
Mississippi State Department of Health, Division of Public 
Health Statistics. The data are tabulations of the number 
of Mississippi residents and nonresidents who received 
abortions each month in 1992. For residents of 
Mississippi, age, race, education level, county of 
residence and gestation of the pregnancy were recorded. To 
determine whether women went to neighboring states for
21
abortions, the same data was collected for Mississippi 
residents from the adjacent states of Alabama and 
Tennessee.
After controlling for monthly fluctuations in abortion 
rates, abortions performed dropped 22% in the six months 
following the imposed mandatory delay law. Simultaneously, 
the number of residents of other states who had abortions 
in Mississippi decreased by 30% and 17% more Mississippi 
residents had abortions in Alabama and Tennessee than 
before the state law.
The gestational ages at which pregnancies were 
terminated changed significantly. Among Mississippi 
residents having abortions, the percentage having the 
procedure at less than 9 weeks fell by 25%. Abortions 
performed at greater than 12 weeks increased by 17% in the 
two periods.
Althaus and Henshaw also examined which women may have 
been more affected by the 24-hour delay law. For those 
without a high school degree, there was a 2 8% decrease in 
abortion as compared to a 10% decline for high school 
graduates. Neither age nor race was statistically 
significant. Also, the abortion rates among women who 
lived within a county with an abortion provider, within 50
22
miles of a provider, and lived farther than 50 miles from a 
provider did not vary after the mandatory delay law was 
imposed.
Economic Theory and Abortion Timing
Developing the argument that economic variables 
determine when a woman decides to have her abortion 
requires using the abortion demand model applied in the 
previously described research. The abortion demand model 
hypothesizes that a woman chooses to have an abortion or 
keep her pregnancy by using the utility maximizing cost- 
benefit analysis. If the net costs of having the child are 
higher than the net costs of aborting it, the abortion 
demand model states that a woman will terminate her 
pregnancy.
There are, arguably, two components to a woman's 
fertility decision process, learning about the relevant 
cost information and weighing it. A woman learns what the 
costs and benefits of having an abortion are and having a 
child and then she weighs those costs in order to make her 
decision.
No information was reported for between weeks between 9 and 12.
Costs associated with abortion include the price of the 
abortion, the travel cost, the physical discomfort of the 
procedure, and the psychic or spiritual cost of terminating a 
pregnancy. The costs of keeping the child include the financial 
costs of raising the child; the opportunity cost of lost wages;
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Inherent to this two-step process is that it requires 
a certain amount of time. Given that women evidently abort 
their pregnancies at different times, it seems women take 
different amounts time to make their decisions. Because 
the abortion decision process has two components, this 
varied time could be attributed to either the time it takes 
to learn about their fertility options, the time it takes 
to weigh them, or both.
In terms of gathering the fertility option 
information, a woman who is well educated and has 
accomplished goals that require initiative, would arguably 
take a relatively short amount of time collecting 
information about her fertility decision. Alternatively, a 
young girl who does not have the personal experience 
necessary to collect information on the net costs of 
fertility options would take a relatively longer time 
obtaining such information.^^
In the economic model of fertility, the relative 
economic costs determine if a woman aborts or keeps her
the opportunity cost of future opportunities related to 
education, employment, or recreation; and the physical cost of 
the pregnancy.
The Alan Guttmacher Institute states that 20% of all abortions 
are performed on teenagers. Of second trimester abortions, that 
percentage increases to 33%. This information was obtained from 
the Alan Guttmacher Institute website www.agiusa.org/pubs/fb- 
induced_abortion.html.
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p r e g n a n c y . T h e  costs and benefits associated with making 
the abortion decision may also well determine when the 
decision is made. From the fertility model, a woman who 
terminates her pregnancy considers the costs of having the 
child to be higher than the costs of the abortion. How 
long it takes her to make the decision to abort could be 
determined by the relative difference between her net 
costs. More specifically, if a woman has low costs 
associated with abortion relative to the costs of having 
the child, it is a clearer, more obvious decision for her 
to make and, thus, she will make it earlier. Consider, for 
example, a woman who lives close to an abortion provider 
and has no moral dilemma associated with abortion. 
Simultaneously, she has a high paying job, and therefore, a 
high opportunity cost of having a child. Given these 
choices, she will presumably have greater ease in making 
her decision to have an abortion and will make it earlier.
Alternatively, if a woman's costs of having an 
abortion are relatively close to the opportunity costs of 
her having the child, she will have a harder time making
Another fertility option is adoption. Throughout the 
literature, however, adoption was intentionally ignored because 
it is chosen so rarely. Despite this omission, it is still a 
relevant option and warrants mentioning. In terms of the 
economic model of fertility, then, adoption is presumably rarely
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the decision. This difficulty requires a longer time. For 
example, if a woman is conservative and finds terminating 
her pregnancy morally troublesome, which is a high 
psychological cost associated with abortion, and she is 
married, which Medoff argues lessens the cost of having a 
child, she has a more complicated choice to make. Because 
her options are more ambiguous, she will take a longer time 
to make her decision.
Chapter Conclusion 
The hypothesis that economic factors affect when a 
woman aborts her pregnancy is somewhat intuitive rather 
than formal. However, previous research in both sociology 
and economics provide the em.pirical and theoretical 
contexts within which to think about this hypothesis. 
Sociologists have illustrated how abortion trends have 
changed, indicating that the timing of abortions requires 
analyses in an economic framework. Abortion demand studies 
are useful to this study by both demonstrating that the 
decision to have an abortion can be placed in a cost- 
benefit decision making framework and by determining which 
costs and benefits are weighed in the decision. In this 
theoretical framework, a woman has her abortion only after
chosen because the psychic cost of carrying a child and then 
giving that child up is very high.
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enough time has elapsed for her to weigh the costs and 
benefits of her abortion decision. Both learning about the 
costs associated with the abortion decision and the degree 
of separation between these costs are what determine how 




DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
This chapter describes the data used to study the 
determinants of gestational ages at the time of abortion.
It then builds an econometric model of the abortion timing 
decision based on client economic and sociological 
characteristics. Each of the independent variables is 
described and a hypothesis presented regarding their 
individual effects on abortion timing. The model seeks to 
explain the factors that delay abortion beyond 12 weeks 
from the last menstrual period. Following the model 
explanation, descriptive statistics on the model's 
independent variables are provided.
Data
The data used in this study is from Blue Mountain 
Clinic (BMC), a family practice clinic in Missoula, Montana 
that provides abortion services.
Planned Parenthood of Montana, as well as various private 
physicians, also provide abortions in Missoula.
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The data was collected in two ways. First, BMC clinic 
administered a survey to all of its abortion clients from 
the first abortion service day in October 1998 to the last 
abortion service day in September 1999.^° Three hundred and 
forty one clients were asked to complete the survey. Each 
patient was asked to provide information on her income 
level; number of people supported by household income; 
ethnicity; education level; employment status; student 
status ; medical insurance coverage status; means of payment 
(including insurance, when available); and reasons for 
choosing Blue Mountain Clinic as her provider.
The second set of data was from the chart information 
of the surveyed clients. For each client, these included 
the gestational age of the pregnancy at the time of 
abortion; the number of days between the date of her 
positive pregnancy test and when she called the clinic to 
seek an abortion; number of previous pregnancies, including 
the number of previous live births, miscarriages, and 
abortions; city of residence; and her age.
Blue Mountain Clinic typically provides abortions three times 
per month. The number of patients provided abortions on these 
days ranges from as few as 5 to as many as 20.
Each client filled out at least some portion of the survey. 
However, not every client completed the survey.
A copy of the survey is provided in Appendix D.
This information has been treated confidentially.
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Not all of the variables obtained were used in this 
analysis. However, descriptives for all of the variables 
were calculated at the request of Blue Mountain Clinic and 
are reported in Appendix E.
General Model and Hypothesis
This thesis seeks to estimate the probability that a 
woman defers her abortion past the 12^^ week LMP. A model 
predicting this probability is given by:
Pg = f[TRAVEL, TEEN, PREVAB, INCOME, COLLEGE1, WHITE, LFP,
MARRIED] (3.1)
Pg is the probability that a woman will defer her 
abortion past the 12^^ week LMP. The reason for choosing 
this gestational age is that the 13^^ week is nearing the 
second trimester and is when medical risks associated with 
the abortion service increase.
TRAVEL is the miles that a woman traveled to obtain an 
abortion. TRAVEL represents the travel cost associated 
with having an abortion; the farther a woman must travel to 
obtain an abortion, the higher the abortion cost. The 
higher the costs associated with abortion, the less clearly 
preferable it is to have the procedure. It is hypothesized
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that a higher travel cost will increase the probability 
that a woman will have an abortion after the 12^^ week.
Montana does not currently have any active abortion 
restrictions. However, TRAVEL can be used to assess the 
effects of a mandatory delay law, which imposes a time cost 
on women seeking abortions. Like a delay law, travel 
imposes costs in the form of time loss and, in some cases, 
out of pocket expenses for overnight stays away from home.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Garbacz used 
SITE, or the number of abortion sites per million 
population of reproductive age that are located in rural 
areas of each state, to capture the travel cost effect. 
TRAVEL is a more precise measurement. It was calculated by 
measuring the distance in miles between a client ̂ s city of 
residence and Missoula, the locale of Blue Mountain 
C l i n i c . I f  a client's city of residence was Missoula, it 
was assumed that their miles traveled was 5.
TEEN is a dummy variable measuring whether a woman is 
younger than eighteen years old. The control group is 
adult women eighteen or older. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
teenagers might take a longer time in gathering and
This was estimated in November 1999 by an Infoseek website that 
calculated distances. The web address is www.mapquest.com/ 
infoseek/mqtripplus.
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assessing their information on the costs of both abortion 
and maintaining the pregnancy. Thus, they are hypothesized 
to terminate their pregnancies later rather than earlier. 
TEEN is hypothesized to have a positive coefficient.
PREVAB is a dummy variable measuring whether or not a woman 
has had a previous abortion. Its inclusion follows the 
line of reasoning that the amount of time it takes to 
gather the necessary information relevant in making the 
abortion decision determines the timing of the decision.
If a woman has had an abortion, she has already taken the 
time to gather information; the timing of the decision only 
depends on the time it takes to weigh the relative costs 
and benefits. PREVAB is hypothesized to be negatively 
associated to the probability that a woman has her abortion 
at 13 weeks or later.
INCOME1 is the level of a client's household income.
Medoff and Garbacz contend that abortion is a normal good, 
indicating that when income increases, demand for abortion 
increases. This implies that the higher a woman's income, 
the higher is the opportunity cost associated with having a 
child. In this study, it is hypothesized that the greater 
the relative difference between the costs of the abortion 
and the cost of childrearing, the faster the choice to
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abort or not is made. Thus, the higher the income level, 
the lower the probability that a woman will defer her 
abortion past the 12^^ week. Income is argued to be 
negatively related to Pg.
In the survey, INCOME is recorded in one of eight 
categories. Inclusion in a category is represented by 
dummy variables, with household income under $5,000 being 
the base case. Thus, there are 7 dummy INCOME variables, 
each labeled by number. For example INCOME2 is the dummy 
variable for the 2̂  ̂ lowest income category, "$5,001- 
$15,000." INCOMES is the income category, over "$65,000."
COLLEGE1 is a dummy variable indicating whether a woman has 
gone to one year of college. If is assumed that the timing 
of the abortion decision is informed by how long it takes a 
woman to gather the information that is weighed in the 
fertility decision. If a woman is educated, she may 
already have that information or she may be more efficient, 
from experience, in getting the information.
It is hypothesized that having completed a year of 
college indicates a level of experience not necessarily
The income categories are: $5,000, $5,001-$15,000, $15,001-
$2 5,000, $2 5,0 01-$35,0 00, $3 5,001-$45,000, $45,0 01-$5 5,00 0, 
$55,001-$65,001, and over $65,000.
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obtained with a high school diploma. Women who have gone 
to college have taken the initiative to apply for college 
and complete two semesters. This demonstrates a level of 
maturity required to gather the fertility decision 
information. Thus, COLLEGEl is hypothesized to be 
negatively related to Pg.
WHITE is a dummy variable measuring whether a woman is 
Caucasian. The base case represents women who are Native 
American, African-American, Spanish, or Asian.
This ethnic variable is included in this study to be 
congruent with both Garbacz's study, which included a dummy 
variable for the percentage of women of child-bearing age 
who are black in each state, and other sociological studies 
that measure abortion trends by racial groups. Garbacz 
stated that black women have a higher abortion rate than 
white women. Presumably, any factor that raises the 
abortion rate for a group tends to reduce the probability 
of delay. Thus, WHITE is hypothesized to be positively 
related to the probability that a woman defers past the 12^^ 
week LMP.
Garbacz measured education as the percentage of the population 
twenty-five years or older that had earned a high school degree 
or GED.
One example of such a study is "Sociodemographic Determinants 
of Abortion in the United States" by Powell-Griner and Trent 
(1987) .
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IjFP is a dummy variable measuring whether a woman is
employed. According to Medoff, a woman who is working is
earning wages she would have to give up if she had a child
and is expected to have a higher demand for abortions.
That logic applied to this study would mean that a woman who 
was employed would make her abortion decision faster than
women who do not work. However, women who work also have
higher costs associated with abortion. LFP could represent 
the opportunity cost of arranging to miss and losing a work
day to have an abortion, which would arguably have a
positive effect on the probability of deferring an 
abortion. Thus, the effect LFP has on the probability that 
a woman has her abortion past the 12^^ week LMP is unknown.^®
MARRIED is a dummy variable representing women who are 
married. The base case represents women who are single, 
divorced, or separated. Medoff included a variable for 
single women arguing that single women have higher costs 
associated with having the child than married women. 
Alternatively, married women have lower costs associated 
with having the child. Married women, based on their set
Because the expected sign the coefficient is unknown, a two- 
sided t-test is necessary.
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of costs, are expected to be more ambivalent about abortion 
than single women and, therefore, more likely to delay.
Variable Description 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for AGE, AB, 
and LMP, and TRAVEL. AGE is the client's age. AB is the 
number of previous abortions each client has previously 
had. LMP is the gestational age (by last menstrual period) 
of each client's terminated pregnancy. TRAVEL is miles 
each client traveled to Blue Mountain Clinic.
TABLE 3.1
DESCRIPTIV]2S
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
LMP 285 3 . 5 14.5 8 .067 2 .565
TRAVEL 294 5.0 711. 7 90 . 729 94.651
AGE 295 15 46 25 . 13 6.71
AB 285 0 5 .47 . 82
Table 3.2 presents frequencies for the model's dummy 
variables. LMP13, TEEN, and PREVAB are the dummy variables 
formed from LMP, AGE, and A B . LFP, or labor force 
participation, is a dummy variable for women who work. 
COLLEGE is a dummy variable for women who have gone to at 
least one year of college. WHITE is a dummy variable 
representing a Caucasian woman, rather than a Native 
American, African-American, Hispanic, or Asian woman.
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Finally, INCOME1 through INCOMES represent the different 
levels of household income. INCOMEl is the base case.
TABLE 3.2
FREQUENCIES FOR DUMMY VARIABL]3S
VARIABLE N̂ ^ 0 Values 1 Values 1 Values/N
LMP 13 285 263 22 7.7
TEEN 295 270 25 8 . 5
PREVAB 285 190 95 33.3
MARRIED 324 272 52 16 . 05
WHITE 317 30 287 90.5
COLLEGEl 327 130 197 60.2
INCOMEl 300 58 242 19.3
INCOME2 300 96 204 32 . 0
INCOME3 300 58 242 19.3
INCOME4 300 34 266 11.3
INCOME5 300 16 284 5 . 3
INCOME6 300 13 287 4.3
INCOME7 300 8 292 2 . 7
INCOMES 300 7 293 5.7
As illustrated in Table 3.2, over 50% of the clients 
indicated their household income was less than $15,000.
Pie Chart 3.1 illustrates the distribution of 
household income for clients under 23 years old. Pie Chart 
3.2 illustrates the distribution of household income for 
clients 23 and older. When comparing these graphs, it is 
noticeable that almost 7 0% of the clients under age 23 
indicated their income was $15,000 or less and
39 number of observations differs for each variable because
some clients did not complete the survey.
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approximately 37% of women 2 3 and older reported income 
$15,000 or less.
It is not realistic that most of the younger women 
live in households with low income and women over 22 live 
in relatively high-income households. Presumably, many of 
the younger women, rather than indicating their household 
income, reported their personal income. If this is so, 
INCOME is mismeasured.
Despite this potential sampling problem, INCOME is 
retained in the model because of its theoretical 
importance. The problem can be lessened by reducing INCOME 
from 8 categories to 2.^°
40 INCOMEl and INCÜME2 represent the 1 values.
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The first section of this chapter derives the logit 
equation used to estimate the abortion timing model and 
then presents the model results. The second section 
interprets the model results and discusses these 
estimations in terms of their economic significance.
Logit Estimation Method
Given that the dependent variable Pg measures the 
probability of whether or not a woman terminates her 
pregnancy after 12 weeks LMP, the appropriate measurement 
tool is logit, in which the dependent variable is 
continuous but bounded between 0 and 1.
Deriving the logit model begins with the cumulative 
logistic distribution function 4.1.^^
Pi = E(Y = l l X i ) =  1 / (1 + e'tBl + ) (4.1)
SHAZAM was used to estimate the Logit model.
Discussion and derivation of the logit model was acquired from 
Gujarati (1995).
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To simplify the expression, it can be written as equation 
4.2.
Pi = 1 / (1 + (4.2)
where the index Zi = Bi + B2Xi.+ U
Pi ranges from 0 to 1 as Zi ranges from negative 
infinity to positive infinity. Pi is nonlinearly related to 
Zi in terms of both the independent variables and the betas 
However, this is easily resolved by transforming equation 
(4.2) . If Pi is the probability of abortion after 12 weeks 
LMP, then (1 - Pi) is the probability of abortion at 12 
weeks or earlier.
1 - P i =  = l /  (1 + (4.3)
Equation (4.4) is the odds ratio in favor of 
terminating pregnancy after 12 weeks. In other words, it 
is the ratio of the probability of deferring abortion after 
12 weeks to the probability of having it at 12 weeks or 
earlier.
P i  / ( 1  -  P i  ) = (1 + e^M/(l + ( 4 . 4 )
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When the log of the odds ratio is taken, L (4.5) is 
both linear in X and the parameters. L is called the 
logit.
Li = In (Pi / (1 - Pi ) ) = Zi (4.5)
As Pi ranges from 0 to 1, the logit model goes from 
negative infinity to positive infinity. In linear 
regression equations, the estimated slope-coefficient 
represents the average effect on the dependent variable for 
a one unit change in the explanatory variables.
Interpreting the coefficients of the logit model is not so 
straightforward.
Li = In (Pi / (1 - Pi )) = Bi + BkXi.+ Ui (4.6)
In equation (4.6), represents the change in L for a 
unit change in X. In other words, it illustrates how the 
log-odds in favor of deferring an abortion changes as the 
explanatory variables change. The intercept Bi is the value 
of the log-odds ratio in favor of abortion occurring after 
12 weeks when the independent variables are all zero.
In terms of probability for continuous variables, 
these marginal effects can be derived with calculus.
P i  = 1 / { 1 + e ' ^ " )  = ( 4 . 7 )
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= / (1 + (4.8)
* (1 + (4.9)
In equation (4.9), taking the partial derivative of X 
with respect to the probability Pi gives:
dPi/dXk = (ê ' * (1 + dXk = (4.10)
= Bk * e ^ W  (1 + e^ )̂̂  = (4.11)
- Bk * P(1 - P) (4.12)
As shown in equation 4.12, measuring the rate of
change in probability with respect to X involves both Bk and 
the level of probability from which the change is measured. 
The given probabilities are typically evaluated at the 
means.
Interpreting changes in probability for binomial dummy 
variables requires first picking baseline values and 
computing the log of the odds-ratio for these values.
Then, exponentiating the log of the odds-ratio isolates the 
odds-ratio. Solve for the probability at the two values 
(0,1) of the relevant dummy variable. Calculating the
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difference gives the probability change resulting from the 
specific event, holding other variables constant.
Logit Results 
Table 4.8 presents the results for the logit model.
TABLE 4.1 
LOGIT RESULTS
B S.E. Asymptotic T- 
Ratio
P-Value
INCOME .35811 .65498 .54675 .701
COLLEGEl -1.6574* .72722 -2 .2791 . Oil
TEEN 1.3614* .78939 1.7246 . 042
MARRIED -.55104 1.1762 -.46850 . 682
PREVAB -1.7624** 1.0805 -1.6310 . 051
WHITE -.0514 1.1968 -.042945 . 517
TRAVEL -.001275 . 003767 -.33838 . 638
LFP̂ '̂ .42720 .71156 .60037 . 548
Constant -2.1803 1.4485 -1.5052 .066
*, ** indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Three of the estimated coefficients are significant 
and four are not. COLLEGEl, a dummy variable for women who 
have completed one year of college, is significant at the 
5% level. TEEN, a dummy variable for women who are under 
18 years old, is also significant at the 5% level. PREVAB, 
a dummy variable indicating if a woman has had a previous 
abortion, and the constant are significant at the 10% 
level.
Explanation by Roncek (1991).
44 The p-Value for LFP is two-sided.
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The remaining five variables, INCOME, MARRIED, WHITE, 
TRAVEL, and LFP are insignificant. All of the estimated 
coefficients, except for TRAVEL and MARRIED, have the 
expected signs. In the previous chapter, both TRAVEL and 
MARRIED were hypothesized to have a positive effect on the 
probability that a woman defers her abortion to the 13 
week. Their coefficients are actually negative.
In terms of goodness of fit, the conventional R̂  
measures are not appropriate when the dependent variable y 
takes on values 0 or 1. Maddala provides several R^-type 
measures for such qualitative dependent variables, 
including both McFadden's R̂  and the percentage of correct 
predictions.
McFadden"s R̂  is given by the expression
1 — (log LuR/log Lr)
For this model, the McFadden goodness of fit measure is 
.208^̂
Table 4.2 shows the number of both y=l values and y-0 
values correctly and incorrectly predicted. An observation 
is correctly predicted as y-1 if the estimated prob(y=l) is
See Maddala (1992).
Both Craig and Uhler and McFadden's are calculated in 
SHAZAM.
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greater than 0.07. The percentage correctly predicted is 






















The threshold level is 0.07.
Policy Implications of Model Results 
This section presents the estimated probabilities and 
their relative changes that occur when a determinant 
variable changes. With these probabilities, this section 
then discusses the policy implications of the independent 
variables.
Marginal Effects and Probability Changes 
All of the variables, except for TRAVEL, are dummy 
variables. As described in the previous chapter, the 
probability resulting from a change in dummy variables from 
0 to 1 can be calculated by estimating the difference
47 For a detailed explanation of classification tables, see
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between the mean probabilities when the dummy is 1 and when 
the dummy is 0. For TRAVEL, the marginal effect can be 
estimated by taking the derivative of the independent 
variable with respect to P. Table 4.3 presents these 
estimated effects on the probability that a woman will 
defer her abortion to the 13^^ week.'^®
TABLE 4.3 
PROBABILITIES
VARIABLES Changes in Probabilities





LFP 0 . 02205
WHITE -0.02708
TRAVEL -0 . 00009
In Chapter 2, it was hypothesized that the time it 
takes a woman to decide on abortion is a function of both
Kennedy (1992) .
These figures are calculated using the mean values of all the 
independent variables except for the variable for which the 
probability change is being calculated.
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the ability of the woman to gather the relevant cost 
information and how high the abortion costs that she faces 
are relative to the cost of having a child. These results 
suggest that what affects abortion timing is not the set of 
costs a woman faces, but how long it takes her to learn 
about the costs.
TRAVEL, INCOME, LFP, and MARRIED, all variables that 
the fertility model stated represent various opportunity 
costs, were found insignificant. In other words, the 
margin of error was high enough that the effect was not 
significantly different from zero. For TRAVEL, WHITE, and 
MARRIED, the margin of error was high enough that the 
effect is possibly opposite of what was hypothesized. For 
TRAVEL, if her miles traveled were to increase by 10, the 
probability that she will defer her abortion decreases by 
.09 percentage points, ceteris parabus. Being married 
rather than single, divorced, or widowed, decreases the 
probability by 3 7%, from 6.7% to 4.2% that a woman will 
have her abortion past 12 weeks, all else held constant.
If a woman has a household income of $15,000 or less, 
the probability that she will defer her abortion is 5.4%.
If she is in a higher income bracket, that probability 
increases by 1.8 percentage points to 7.2%, all else held 
constant.
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The probability that a woman will defer her abortion 
past the 12*̂  ̂week decreases from 5% to 7.1% if she has a 
wage-earning job, ceteris para.hus. When a woman is white, 
rather than of African-American, Hispanic, Native American, 
or Asian descent, the probability that she defers decreases 
from 6.7% to 6.4%, a 4% change, ceteris parahus,
Given that the coefficients of the various cost 
variables were found insignificant, it appears that the 
economic costs in this model are not relevant to the timing 
of the decision. Further, by associating the costs of 
mandatory delay laws with the economic costs in this model, 
these results indicate that abortion regulations do not 
affect abortion timing.
These results, which indicate that costs imposed by 
mandatory delay laws do not affect when a woman has her 
abortion, do not follow Althaus and Henshaw's study of 
Mississippi's mandatory delay laws and gestational ages.
They observed an increase in gestational ages when a 
mandatory delay law was imposed. It is quite possible that 
determining how abortion regulations affect abortion timing 
by inferring from the effects of other economic costs is 
not a suitable way to measure regulatory effects.
As noted in Chapter 2, it is not persuasive to 
presume, as Medoff does, that the net increase in the full
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cost of an abortion which would result from making abortion 
illegal can be captured by the estimated 50% increase in 
price. In this the same way, TRAVEL may not be a suitable 
proxy variable for the costs imposed by a mandatory delay 
law. The time cost associated with traveling long 
distances might only be a small portion of the economic 
costs that a mandatory delay law would potentially impose. 
Without Montana abortion regulations. Blue Mountain 
Clinic's clients who travel relatively far distances 
typically do not stay overnight in Missoula but drive there 
in the early m o r n i n g . I f  a mandatory delay law required 
women to meet with their provider on two different 
occasions, it would automatically require a two day visit 
in Missoula. This would entail staying overnight or 
traveling twice to the clinic. Other opportunity costs 
that would potentially increase are days missed from work; 
if the client is under eighteen, secretly arranging to miss 
more school; and the psychological cost of being required 
to prolong the abortion process.
Personal experience working at Blue Mountain Clinic.
Provider availability complicates the matter further. If a 
woman is required to meet with her doctor on both visits, the 
time required to get an abortion may be more than two days. Blue 
Mountain Clinic's providers have private practices and are 
typically available for abortions one day a week. In this case, 
a woman would meet with her physician one day and the following 
week return for the abortion, lengthening the time it takes to 
get the abortion by five days.
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The fact that the variables of this model representing 
various economic costs were not found statistically 
significant indicates that these particular economic costs 
do not affect whether Blue Mountain Clinic's abortion 
clients defer their procedures until the 13^^ week LMP. 
Because abortion regulations represent an economic cost, it 
seems logical to deduce how abortion regulations affect 
when a woman has her procedure. However, given that 
Medoff's interpretation of the possible effects of 
prohibiting abortion from his price variable seemed to 
undervalue how women would respond to such legislation and 
that Althaus and Henshaw illustrated a contrary result, it 
may not be appropriate to interpret how the economic cost 
of abortion regulation affects abortion timing.
The statistically significant variables COLLEGEl, 
PREVAB and TEEN represent various levels of experience that 
determine how quickly a woman gathers the fertility cost 
information. Everything else held constant, going to 
college for at least one year decreases the probability 
that a woman will defer her abortion by 77%, or a decrease 
from 11.1% to 2.5%. This dramatic decrease indicates that 
a woman's college experience, which arguably provides her 
with skills conducive to gathering fertility information, 
reduces the time it takes for her to get an abortion.
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The probability that a woman who has had a previous 
abortion will defer her abortion is 6.5 percentage points 
lower, or 79% less, than for a woman who has not had the 
procedure, ceteris parabus. This indicates that a woman 
who has had at least one previous abortion takes less time 
to have another one, presumably because she has already 
gathered and weighed the fertility information. Thus, when 
she makes the decision again, she need not take the same 
amount of time.
When the woman having an abortion is a teenager, the 
probability that she will have her abortion past 12 weeks 
LMP is 15% while the probability that a woman older than 17 
will defer is 5%, The probability, then, increases by 200% 
when the woman having the abortion is younger than 18, 
ceteris parabus. Quite possibly, teenagers lack the 
experience that calling an abortion facility or other 
services, such as pregnancy counseling, would require. 
Lacking this experience, it seems they postpone or put off 
taking the initiative to get the cost information, 
lengthening the time it takes for them to decide on 
abortion.
The fact that COLLEGEl, PREVAB and TEEN, which all 
signify a woman's ability to gather relevant fertility cost 
information, all demonstrate strong effects on abortion
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timing indicates that this is should be an area of concern 
for those who provide this relevant information- In terms 
of facilities that provide abortions and organizations that 
provide pregnancy and adoption services, the more readily 
available and thorough the cost information is, the easier 
it is for women to learn about it and, therefore, the 
faster they will do so. Since teenagers noticeably differ 
by having their abortions past the 12^^ week (LMP), it seems 
that they are less adept at learning the relevant 
information and would possibly benefit from learning skills 
with which they could navigate fertility information.^^
Providing cost information in a nonjudgmental manner is, 
arguably, also a way to make it easily accessible.
52 One example of how to do this is Blue Mountain Clinic's 
Healthapalooza Festival. This annual event is specifically 





This chapter summarizes the hypothesis and results of 
this study and makes suggestions for further research on 
the topic of abortion timing.
Summary
In 1991, the Supreme Court permitted states to impose 
abortion regulations on women so long as such restrictions 
did not interfere with a woman's ability to have the 
abortion. Although states vary in which, if any, 
regulations they impose, typical state regulations include 
mandatory delay laws, parental consent laws, and 
restrictions on Medicaid funding.
As abortion rates change over time, economists have 
been using demand analysis to assess whether state 
restrictions, as well as other economic costs, decrease the 
demand for abortion. Their results have shown that 
abortion rates do, in fact, respond to changes in economic 
c o s t s .
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Another relevant abortion issue amenable to economic 
analysis is what determines when a woman has the procedure. 
Do economic costs affect the timing of abortion? More 
specifically, do state regulations, like mandatory delay 
laws, defer when a woman has her abortion? This thesis 
studied this question by using the economic theory of 
fertility to analyze the timing element of the abortion 
decision.
According to the abortion demand model, the decision 
to have an abortion is made by weighing the costs and 
benefits of having an abortion versus having a child. It 
was hypothesized here that making this decision takes a 
certain amount of time. This amount of time is determined 
by both how long it takes to gather the information on the 
costs of abortion and having the child as well as the 
degree of difference between these costs.
Using a logit model, this study estimated the 
probability that a woman defers her abortion past the 12^^ 
week LMP based on a set of economic and sociological 
factors. These factors included whether a woman has had a 
previous abortion (PREVAB), if a woman has completed at 
least a year of college (COLLEGEl), her race (WHITE), and 
whether she was under the age of eighteen (TEEN).
Variables that represented an economic cost were the miles
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a woman traveled to the clinic (TRAVEL), whether she was 
employed (LFP), her marital status (MARRIED), and her 
income (INCOME).
In the analysis, all the coefficients for the economic 
variables were insignificant, implying that their impact on 
abortion timing is minimal. The three significant results, 
TEEN, COLLEGEl, and PREVAB, all represented characteristics 
that illustrate a woman's ability to gather the relevant 
abortion information.
In terms of the abortion timing hypothesis, it appears 
that what determines when a woman has her abortion is not 
the set of economic costs she faces but her ability to 
learn about such costs. What this suggests about state 
regulations that impose, at the very least, a time cost is 
that they do not deter abortions into the later part of the 
first trimester.
Suggestions for Further Research 
Given that Althaus and Henshaw's results, that 
mandatory delay laws do affect the gestational age at which 
a woman aborts her pregnancy, are contrary to the results 
reported here, the hypothesis that when a woman has her 
abortion is determined by a set of economic and social 
factors deserves further attention. This study used data
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for one state for one year while no abortion regulations 
were in place. The sociological study was conducted for 
one year for Mississippi and its adjacent states. In that 
time, the mandatory delay law was imposed and the effects 
of that change were examined. For further research on 
abortion timing in economics, it would be sensible to 
conduct a study analogous to the Mississippi study. In 
other words, analyze the gestational ages of terminated 
pregnancies in a state which first has no mandatory delay 
law in effect and then imposes one. This would directly 
measure the effects of abortion regulations on when a woman 
has an abortion, analysis not possible given this data set.
Another possibility for examining the effect of state 
regulation on abortion timing would be to conduct a multi­
state study, as Medoff and Garbacz both did in their 
abortion demand research, and include a dummy variable for 
the presence of mandatory delay laws. In this case, the 
average gestational age in each state could be measured as 
a function of, among other factors, the presence or absence 
of state mandatory delay laws.
In order to examine the effects of parental consent 
laws on teenagers' abortion timing, one could do a separate 
regression for teenagers, similar to Garbacz's. Again, if 
it was conducted nationwide, a dummy variable would be
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included for the presence of parental consent laws. 
Alternatively, if research on teenagers is conducted for 
one state, as was suggested for studying effects of 
mandatory delay laws, a time-series study would be 
appropriate, one that examines the before and after effects 
of a parental consent law.
In this particular study, a binary logit model 
statistically estimated the probability that a woman 
deferred her abortion past the 12 week LMP- How the 
independent variables affect gestational ages could also be 
measured by doing a multinomial logit model, in which the 
dependent variable Y has more than 2 categories. This 
model would provide for more explanation because it would 
define the dependent variable in less definitive terms.
Concluding Remarks
Abortions that are performed both late in the first 
trimester and in the second trimester are of great concern 
given the increased medical risk associated with such 
procedures. These results demonstrated that, although the 
economic costs analyzed do not seem relevant to when a 
woman aborts her pregnancy, women who are relatively less 
adept at acquiring important fertility information are more 
likely to defer their procedures.
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When a woman has her abortion is a topic that has not 
been thoroughly considered in either sociology or 
economics. Given that many argue the restrictions states 
impose on women who seek abortions place them at medical 
risk and that Althaus and Henshaw's results are so contrary 
to the results found here, the question of what determines 
why some women defer their abortions is clearly not 
answered and continuing research on this issue seems 
imperative in order to do so.
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APPENDIX A
HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS^^
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
By a vote of 1-2, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of 
contraceptives, holding that the statute violated the 
constitutional right to marital privacy.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
By a vote of 6-1, the Court invalidated a law 
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
people, holding that the constitutional right to privacy 
extends to the reproductive decisions of both married and 
unmarried people.
Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
By a vote of 7-2, the Court invalidated a Texas law 
prohibiting abortions not necessary to save the woman's 
life. The Court held that the fundamental right to privacy 
extends to a woman's decision whether or not to have an 
abortion and that any governmental interference with that
This information was obtained by the National Abortion Rights 
Action League website www.naral.org/publications/facts/sup.html. 
on April 23, 2000.
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right is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The Court 
recognized two compelling state interests sufficient to 
justify restrictions on a woman's right to choose. States 
may regulate the abortion procedure after the first 
trimester of pregnancy in ways necessary to promote a 
woman's health. After the point of fetal viability —  
approximately 24 to 2 8 weeks -- a state may, to protect the 
potential life of the fetus, prohibit abortions not 
necessary to preserve the woman's life or health.
Doe V. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
Decided with Roe v. Wade. By a vote of 7-2, the Court 
invalidated provisions of a Georgia law that required that
(1) any abortion be performed in a hospital; (2) a woman 
secure the approval of three physicians and a hospital 
committee before obtaining an abortion; and (3) a woman 
seeking to obtain an abortion be a resident of the state.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
By a vote of 7-2, the Court invalidated the 
application of a Virginia statute that prohibited the 
advertisement of abortion services.
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Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975)
The Court unanimously upheld the use of a Connecticut 
statute that prohibited the performance of abortion to 
prosecute a non-physician.
Bellotti V. Baird (I), 428 U.S. 132 (1976)
The Court unanimously ruled that the district court 
should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality 
of a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent until 
the state court had interpreted the statute. The Court 
noted, however that a state may, in some circumstances, 
require a minor woman to obtain parental consent before 
obtaining an abortion.
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 42 8
U.S. 52 (1976)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court invalidated provisions of 
a Missouri statute that (1) required a married woman to 
obtain the consent of her husband prior to obtaining an 
abortion; (2) required a physician to preserve the life and 
health of the fetus at every stage of pregnancy; and (3) 
prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis as a method of 
abortion. By a vote of 5-4, the Court struck down a 
requirement that an unmarried minor woman obtain the 
written consent of one parent before obtaining an abortion
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because the statute provided no alternative to parental 
consent such as judicial waiver of the consent requirement. 
The Court upheld provisions that (1) required facilities to 
keep confidential records, available only for statistical 
purposes to public health officials, intended to preserve 
maternal health and life by increasing medical knowledge 
and to monitor whether abortions are performed in 
accordance with the law; (2) required that a woman sign a 
consent form prior to an abortion; and (3) defined 
"viability" as "that stage of fetal development when the 
life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely 
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive 
systems."
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court upheld a Connecticut 
prohibition of the use of public funds for abortions, 
except those "medically necessary," even though the state 
provides funding for childbirth.
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Beal V. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977)
Decided with Maher v. Roe. By a vote of 6-3, the Court 
upheld a Pennsylvania regulation that prohibited the use of 
public funds for abortions not "medically necessary."
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)
By a vote of 6-3, per curiam, the Court upheld the 
refusal of a public hospital to provide publicly funded 
abortions when there was no threat to the health or life of 
the woman.
Carey v. Population Services,431 U.S. 678 (1977)
By a vote of 7-2, the Court invalidated a New York law 
prohibiting the sale or distribution of contraceptives to 
minors.
Colautti V. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court invalidated as 
unconstitutionally vague a Pennsylvania statute that 
required a physician, under threat of criminal penalties, 
to use the method and "degree of care" most likely to 
preserve the life and health of the fetus if the physician 
determined the fetus was viable or had "sufficient reason 
to believe that the fetus may be viable."
65
Bellotti V. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
By a vote of 8-1, the Court invalidated a 
Massachusetts law that required a minor to obtain the 
consent of both parents before obtaining an abortion. Four 
Justices reasoned that the procedure for judicial waiver 
was unconstitutional because it required parental 
consultation in every case before the minor woman was 
permitted to go to court to demonstrate that she was mature 
enough to make her own decision or that an abortion was in 
her best interests. Four other Justices considered the 
statute unconstitutional because it provided an absolute 
veto over a minor woman's abortion decision to a third- 
party, whether a parent or a judge.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld the Hyde amendment, 
which prohibits the use of federal funds for abortions not 
necessary to preserve the woman's life. The Court also held 
that states that participate in the Medicaid program are 
not required by Title XIX of the Social Security Act to 
fund medically necessary abortions for which federal funds 
are unavailable under the Hyde amendment.
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Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980)
Decided with Harris v. McRae. By a vote of 5-4, the 
Court upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting the use of 
state funds for abortions not necessary to save the woman's 
life.
H.L. V. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court upheld as not invalid on 
its face a Utah statute requiring a physician to notify a 
minor woman's parent before performing an abortion, but the 
Court did not decide whether the statute would be 
unconstitutional as applied to a mature minor because the 
plaintiff had not alleged that she was mature.
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 4 62
U.S. 416 (1983)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court invalidated those
provisions of a city ordinance that (1) required physicians
to give their patients anti-abortion information, including
telling them that "the unborn child is a human life from
the moment of conception;" (2) required a 24-hour waiting
period following these lectures; (3) mandated that all
abortions after the first trimester be performed in a
hospital; (4) required parental consent for a minor woman
to obtain an abortion, without providing a procedure for
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waiver of the consent requirement; and (5) required 
physicians to dispose of fetal remains in an unspecified 
"humane and sanitary manner."
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
Decided with Akron Center. By a vote of 6-3, the Court 
invalidated a provision of a Missouri statute that required 
all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a 
hospital. By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld requirements 
that (1) a second physician be present during a post­
viability abortion; (2) a minor woman obtain either 
parental consent or a judicial waiver; and (3) a pathology 
report be made for each abortion.
Simopoulos V. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983)
By a vote of 8-1, the Court affirmed the criminal 
conviction of a physician for performing a second-trimester 
abortion outside a licensed hospital, noting that 
Virginia's definition of "hospital" differed from 
Missouri's and Akron's in that it included "outpatient 
hospitals," and was therefore broad enough to include any 
adequately equipped clinic. Thus, the Court held that the 
Virginia restriction on abortions after the first trimester
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was necessary to promote the health of women obtaining 
abortions.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
By a vote of 5-4, the Court invalidated provisions of 
a Pennsylvania statute that required (1) physicians to give 
their patients anti-abortion information, including 
pictures of fetuses at various stages of development, to 
discourage them from obtaining abortions; (2) the filing of 
detailed reports, available to the public for copying, 
including identification of the attending physician and 
information about the woman obtaining an abortion; (3) a 
physician performing a post-viability abortion to use that 
"degree of care" required to preserve the life and health 
of any unborn child intended to be born and to use the 
method of abortion most likely to preserve the life of the 
fetus, even at some risk to a woman’s health; and (4) the 
presence of a second physician at post-viability abortions 
without providing an exception for a medical emergency.
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989)
By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld provisions of a 
Missouri statute prohibiting the use of public facilities 
or public personnel to perform abortions and requiring a 
physician to make determinations and perform tests 
concerning gestational age, weight and lung maturity when 
he or she has reason to believe a woman to be 2 0 weeks or 
more pregnant. For the first time in the sixteen years 
since Roe v. Wade, only a minority of the Justices on the 
Court -- four Justices -- voted to reaffirm Roe.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)
By a vote of 5-4, the Court invalidated as having no 
rational basis a Minnesota law requiring notification of 
both parents without a procedure for judicial waiver of the 
notice requirement. However, by a vote of 5-4, the Court 
upheld another provision that required two-parent 
notification but included a procedure for judicial waiver, 
as well as a 48-hour waiting period for minors.
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Ohio y. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502
(1990)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court upheld an Ohio statute 
that required a minor woman to notify one parent or obtain 
a judicial waiver, rejecting a facial challenge alleging 
that the burdensome judicial procedure did not fulfill the 
constitutional requirement of a meaningful bypass 
procedure.
Rust V. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld federal regulations 
prohibiting health care professionals at family planning 
clinics that receive Title X funds from counseling or 
referring women regarding abortion, or even informing a 
pregnant patient that abortion is a legal option.
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)
By a vote of 1-2, the Court upheld provisions of a 
Pennsylvania statute that required (1) physicians to 
provide patients with anti-abortion information, including 
pictures of fetuses at various stages of development, to 
discourage women from obtaining abortions; (2) a mandatory 
24-hour delay following these lectures; (3) the filing of 
reports, available for public inspection and copying, 
including the name and location of any facility performing 
abortions that receives any state funds ; and (4) a one- 
parent consent requirement for minors with a judicial 
bypass. The Court explicitly overruled parts of Akron and 
Thornburgh. The plurality opinion of three Justices 
abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to 
fundamental rights for a less protective "undue burden" 
standard of review, which these restrictions passed. Two 
Justices voted to continue to protect the right to choose 
as a fundamental right under Roe by subjecting state 
restrictions to strict scrutiny. These five Justices voted 
to strike down a provision that barred a married woman from 
obtaining an abortion unless she notified her husband. Four 
Justices voted to uphold all challenged provisions and 
overturn Roe completely, stating that it was wrongly
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decided and the Constitution does not protect the right to 
choose.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263
(1993)
By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that a federal civil 
rights law, known as the "Ku Klux Klan" Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1985(3), does not protect women from anti-choice blockaders 
obstructing access to reproductive health clinics. The 
Court held that anti-choice blockades do not constitute 
sex-based discrimination for the purpose of the statute.
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249
(1994)
By a vote of 9-0, the Court held that claims under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) act 
do not require proof of an economic motive, and that the 
National Organization for Women (NOW) and a group of 
women's health centers could pursue their civil suit 
against Joseph Scheidler, the Pro-Life Action Network 
(PLAN) and others anti-choice clinic blockaders.
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994)
By a vote of 5-4 the Court upheld provisions of a 
Florida injunction that (1) created a 36-foot buffer zone 
outside the entrance to a reproductive health clinic; and
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(2) prohibited anti-choice protesters from making noise 
that could be heard by patients inside the clinic during 
the hours in which surgical procedures were performed. The 
Court noted that such injunctions burden "no more speech 
than necessary to serve a significant government interest." 
The court invalidated provisions creating a 300-foot "no 
approach" zone around the clinic, a ban on signs and images 
visible to people inside the clinic, and a 300-foot ban on
picketing outside the residences of clinic employees.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997)
By a vote of 8-1, the Court invalidated the provision 
in a New York injunction that created a 15-foot "floating" 
buffer zone around any person or vehicle seeking access to 
or leaving a clinic. The Court held that the "floating" 
buffer zones "burden more speech than necessary to serve 
the relevant government interests." The Court limited this 
holding to the facts of this case and noted that it did not 
address "whether the governmental interests involved would 
ever justify some sort of zone of separation between 
individuals entering the clinics and protestors, as
measured by the distance between the two." By a vote of 6-
3, the Court upheld a provision creating a 15-foot "fixed" 
buffer zone outside of clinic doorways, driveways, and
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parking lot entrances. The Court also upheld a "cease and
desist" provision that permits two "sidewalk counselors" to
approach a person inside the"fixed" buffer zones unless and 
until the person indicates a desire for the counselor to 
withdraw; the "sidewalk counselor" must then retreat 15 
feet from the person he/she had been counseling and remain 
outside of the buffer zone.
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. C t . 1865 (1997)
By a vote of 6-3, the Court reversed a lower court
ruling that would have permitted health care providers to
move forward with their challenge to a Montana law banning 
the performance of abortion by licensed physician 
assistants working under the supervision of a doctor. 
Without full briefing or oral argument, the Court found 
that, in general, physician-only requirements are 
constitutional. As the Court's first application of the 
"undue burden" standard since Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, this decision indicates 
that the standard is less protective than it initially 
appeared and that regardless of a law’s intended effect, 
the Court will not invalidate state restrictions on 
abortion before viability unless the actual effect is to
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CURRENT STATUS OF STATE ABORTION LAWS
TABLE B.l













AL X X X X
AK X X X X-
AZ X X X X-
AR X X X X
CA X X X
CO X X X
DE X- X- X X
GA X X X X
ID x^ X X
IL X- X X X-
IN X X X X
lA X- X X X
KS X X X X X
KY X X X X
LA X X X X
ME X- X- X X X
MD X X- X
MA X- X X X
MI X X X X
MN X X X X
MS X X X X
MO X X X X
MT^ X X X X-
NE X X X X
NV X X X X-
NM X X x^
NC X- X X
* The information in this appendix on parental consent laws and 
state funding was obtained from the National Abortion Rights 
Action League website www.naral.org/publications/facts/minor.html 
on April 23, 2000.
f In 1999, Montana's abortion restrictions were overturned. See 
Appendix C for a summary of Montana's current abortion 
legislation status.
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ND X X X X
OH X- X X X
PA X X X X
RI X X X X
SC X- X X X
SD X X X X
TN X X X X-
UT Xi X X
VA X X X X
WV X X- X X
WI xif X X X
WY X X X X
Total 32 7 21 18 2 34 9 30
December 19 9 8
Notes :
1. This statute has been declared unenforceable by a 
court or attorney general.
2- This statute also allows consent of or notice to a 
grandparent under certain circumstances.
3. This requirement may be waived by a specified health 
professional under certain circumstances.
4. This statute requires notice to a minor's parents, if 
possible.
5. This statute also allows consent of or notice to a 
grandparent or step-parent.
6. This statute also allows consent of an adult family 
member.
7. This statute offers mandatory counseling as an 
alternative to one-parent or adult family member 
consent with a judicial bypass.
8. This statute, as written, requires two-parent consent, 
but a court has issued an order that the law be 
enforced as requiring the consent of one parent.
9. This statute also allows notice to a grandparent, 
step-parent, or adult sibling over the age of 21 under 
certain circumstances.
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10.This statute allows consent of or notice to a 
grandparent or certain other adult family members over 
the age of 25.
TABLE B .2
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MD X6












* The information on public funding was obtained from the 





















Total 2 30 5 14
December 15, 1998
Notes :
1. Such state policies violate federal law prohibiting 
participating states from excluding abortion from the 
Medicaid program in cases of life endangerment, rape, 
and incest.
2 . A court has ruled that this state must comply with
federal law prohibiting the exclusion of abortion from 
Medicaid in cases of rape or incest as well as life 
endangerment.
3. A court has ruled that the state constitution 
prohibits the state from restricting funding for 
abortion while providing funds for costs associated 
with childbirth.
4. A court has ruled that the state constitution 
prohibits the enforcement of a state law restricting 
funding to the extent it bars funding for an abortion 
necessary to preserve the woman's health.
5. This statute provides funding for some cases of fetal 
anomaly.
6. This state requires that cases of rape and incest be 
reported to a law enforcement or social service agency
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in some circumstances in order for the woman to be 
eligible for a publicly funded abortion.
7. For publicly funded abortions after 20 weeks, a
physician must certify that the fetus is nonviable or 
that pregnancy would endanger the woman's life or 
health.
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REQUIRED INFORMED CONSENT AND MANDATORY DELAY LAWS^
Fourteen states require a delay following state-directed 
counseling before a woman may obtain an abortion:
Idaho, 2 4 hours 
Indiana, 18 hours 
Kansas, 24 hours 
Louisiana, 24 hours 
Michigan, 24 hours 
Mississippi, 24 hours 
Nebraska, 2 4 hours 
North Dakota, 24 hours 
Ohio, 2 4 hours 
Pennsylvania, 2 4 hours 
South Carolina, 1 hour 
South Dakota, 24 hours 
Utah, 2 4 hours 
Wisconsin, 24 hours
In five states, such requirements are enjoined:
• Delaware, 2 4 hours
• Kentucky, 2 4 hours-
• Massachusetts, 24 hours
• Montana, 24 hours
• Tennessee, 48-72 hours
Eight additional states require state-directed counseling 







 ̂ This information was obtained from The Alan Guttmacher 
Institute website www.agi-usa.org/pubs/abort_law_stat.html 





In two states, such requirements are enjoined
Florida
Missouri
 ̂ Enforcement of this law is delayed, pending resolution of 
a legal challenge.
 ̂ The provisions in these laws vary widely— from standard 




A HISTORY OF MONTANA'S REPRODUCTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS^
A court has ruled that the Montana Constitution 
protects the right to reproductive choice as a 
fundamental right and to a greater extent than the 
Federal Constitution.
A court struck down under the state constitution a 
regulation limiting state medical assistance for 
abortion to cases of life endangerment, rape, and 
incest. Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BDV-94-811 (Mont. 
Dist. Ct. May 22, 1995) . A similar restriction has 
been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court under the 
Federal Constitution. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358
(1980) .
A court struck down under the state constitution a law 
requiring either notice to one parent or a judicial 
waiver before a minor could obtain an abortion. 
Wicklund v. State, N o .ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. C t . Feb. 
12, 1999) (summary judgment). No.ADV-97-671 (Mont.
Dist. C t . Feb. 25, 1999) (permanent injunction).
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appeal filed. No. 99-311 (Mont. Apr. 15, 1999), appeal
dismissed (Mont.Nov. 29,1999). Prior to this state 
court decision, this law had been upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court under the federal Constitution. Lambert 
V.Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
A court has struck down under the state constitution a 
provision mandating a 24-hour waiting period prior to 
an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Missoula v. State, 
No. BDV-95.722 (Mont. Dist. C t . Mar. 12, 1999), appeal 
dismissed (Mont. Nov. 29, 1999) . A similar restriction 
has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court under the 
federal Constitution. Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) ,
A court struck down under the state constitution 
provisions prohibiting certified physician assistants 
from performing abortions. Armstrong v. State, No.
BVD 97-627 (Mont. Dist. C t . Dec. 8, 1999). Prior to
this state court decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that it was unlikely that plaintiffs would prevail on 
their claim that these provisions constituted an undue
 ̂ This summary of Montana's reproductive legislative history was 
obtained from the National Abortion Rights Action League website
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burden under the federal Constitution, Mazurek v, 
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
A court struck down under the state constitution a law 
banning so-called "partial-birth" abortion. 
Intermountain Planned Parenthood v. State, N o .BDV 97- 
477 (Mont. Dist. Ct. June 29, 1998), modified (Mont.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 19, 1998). Montana amended its law 
banning so-called "partial-birth" abortion in 1999, 
which has prompted a new court battle concerning the 
constitutionality of such laws, see Ban on Abortion 
Procedures. The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on 
this issue.
W W W .naral.org. on April 23, 2000.
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BLUE MOUNTAIN CLINIC 
CONFIDENTIAL CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Patient # ___________
The information is voluntary, and confidential. We 
appreciate your opinion because it helps us evaluate our 
services and make changes as necessary to accommodate our 
clients.
1. Have you been a client at the Clinic before?
Yes _____  no   If so, last date _______
2. In choosing Blue Mountain Clinic for today's visit, how 
important were each of the following :
Not Little Very
Important Importance Important Important
Cost of the procedure :
How soon an appointment was available :
Ease of scheduling an appointment:
Reputation of Clinic :
Recommendation of friend, etc
Security of building:
Privacy :
Already a patient at Blue Mountain:
3. Did you know that the Clinic provides :
a) family practice health care
yes ___ no
b) pediatric and adolescent health care
yes ___ no
c) prenatal care yes   no
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C) osteopathic and naturopathic medicine
yes no
e) mental health counseling yes no
f ) massage therapy ves no
g) vasectomies yes no
h) acupuncture yes no
4. How far did you travel to get here(one-way)?
5. How did you pay for today's visit: Check all that apply.
Personal Savings _____  Advanced Wages _____
Credit card _____  Pawned Something _____
Family/Friend _____  Car Loan _____
Cashed a Post Other ______
Dated Check _____
6. Do you currently have medical insurance?
yes ______  no__
If yes y will you be billing your insurance for today's 
visit? yes _______  no_____
6. Please evaluate your experience today.
STRONGLY AGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE AGREE
The Doctor:
a)exhibited competence and professional skill
b)treated me with respect
d) answered my questions clearly
The Nurses :
a)exhibited competence and professional skill
b)treated me with respect




b)answered my questions clearly
c)explained the abortion procedure clearly
d) established a trusting and comfortable 
relationship with me
7. Are you: (Circle one)
single married separated
divorced widowed
8. Are you: (Circle one)
White Native Amer. Asian
Hispanic Other__________
9. Highest grade completed in school: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
11 12
10. Number of years of college: 0 1 2  3 4 5+
11. Are you employed? yes ____  no______
If yes, do you work (please circle) full time part 
time full year part year
12. Is your partner employed?
(Circle one) full time part time no
Is your partner a student?
(Circle one) full time part time no
13. Are you a student?
(Circle one) full time part-time no
14. Check the space provided to indicate your household 
income :







$Over $65,0 00/year _____
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15. Number of people supported by your household income 
(Circle one) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8+




STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF ABORTION CLIENTS^
Age
Blue Mountain Clinic's abortion clients ranged from 
ages 15 to 46. The average client was 25.13 years old and 
22 year olds represented the largest percentage of clients 
(9.5%). The median age was 24 and standard deviation 6.71. 
Of the applicable 295 patients, 8.5% were minors. Nineteen 
percent were in their thirties and 3% were in their 
forties.
^See Chapter 4 for a thorough discussion of INCOME'S statistical 
distribution.
92
Bar Chart E .1
Age Distribution




Almost 91% of Blue Mountain Clinic's clients were 
white. Approximately 7 percent (23) were Native American, 
1.3% (4) Hispanic, .6% (2) Black, .3% (1) Asian. Of the
patients that were under 18, 91.7% were white and 8.3% were 
Native American. Almost 90% of those 18 and older were 
white. Approximately 7.5% were Native American, 1.6% 
Hispanic, .8% Black, and .4% Asian.
Marital Status
All of the clients between the ages of 15 and 17 were 
unmarried. Approximately 68% of those 18 and over were 
single. Seventeen percent were married, 4% percent were 
separated and 10.9% were divorced.
Employment
Seventy-five percent of Blue Mountain Clinic's 
patients reported employment. Amongst those wage-earners, 
63.1% worked full-time while the remaining worked part- 
time. Considering clients aged 23 and over, 82.5% were 
employed and, of those, 74.3% worked full-time.
Educat ion
Amongst clients over 18, 92% had graduated from high
s c h o o l . Almost 70% had attended at least one year of
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college. Although they were not asked whether they held a 
college degree, the clients did indicate the number of 
years of college they attended. The average number of 
college years attended was 1.92. Twenty-four percent 
attended at least four years of college, possibly earning a 
college degree. Almost 10% of those surveyed have attended 
5 or more years of college.
Amongst patients older than 18, 30.9% indicated that 
they were currently attending post-secondary school. Of 
those, 74% were attending school full-time and the 
remaining were attending part-time. Eighty percent of 
clients attending school were between the ages of 19-24. 
Eleven percent were between 2 5 and 29. Seven percent were 
30-35. No clients aged 35-40 were attending school. One 
client (2%) aged 46 was attending post-secondary school.
Previous Pregnancies
Half of all clients surveyed have been pregnant 
before. The maximum number of previous pregnancies, which 
includes live births, abortions, and miscarriages, was 9. 
The average number was 1.40. Amongst those older than 18, 
64.2% have had previous pregnancies and 1.5 8 was the 
average number. For clients between the ages of 15 and 18,
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22% have been pregnant before. The largest number of 
pregnancies was 2 and the average was .25.
Amongst all clients surveyed, 44% have at least one 
child. The average number of children was .86 and the 
maximum number was six. For clients younger than 18, one 
was the maximum number of children and 11.1% had one child.
Amongst all patients, 44% had had at least one 
abortion. The highest number of abortions was 5 and the 
average was .53. Amongst women over 18, approximately 37% 
had terminated a pregnancy and 27% had terminated just one 
pregnancy. The average number of abortions was .47. Of 
those 18 and younger, the maximum number of abortions was 
1, 11% had terminated a pregnancy and .11 was the average.
Gestational Age 
For all clients surveyed, the gestational ages (LMP) 
at the time of abortion ranged from 3.5 to 14.5 weeks. The 
most common week of termination (20.7%) was 7 weeks, the 
median was 7 weeks, and the average was 8.0 67 weeks. For 
women above 18 years old, the mode and median were still 7 
weeks. The average gestational age was 7.824. Only 1.5% 
of these patients terminated their pregnancy at either 14 
or 14.5 weeks. For patients between ages 15 and 19, the 
largest percentage (14%) terminated their pregnancy at 14
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weeks. The average gestational age was 9.472 and the 
median was 9 weeks.
Health Insurance
Approximately 56% of clients surveyed had health 
insurance of some kind. Of those insured, 81% did not file 
a claim to pay for their abortion. Fifty-five percent of 
clients above 18 were insured and 82.6% of those clients 
did not file a claim with their insurance company. Amongst 
clients 18 and younger, 63.2% were insured and 87.5% did 
not attempt to pay for their abortion with insurance.
Travel Cost
Of the clients surveyed, 94.6% lived in Montana. Ten 
clients (3.3%) were Idaho residents. Six (2%) were from 
other states but were presumably in Missoula for other 
reasons besides terminating their pregnancy. Of clients 
from Montana, 35.9% were Missoulians.
The average number of miles a client traveled to Blue 
Mountain Clinic was 91. The median number of miles was 57 
and the standard deviation 94.651. The maximum number of 
miles a Montana client traveled was 711.7. The minimum was 
approximately 5 miles. The average Montana resident 
traveled 87.23 and the standard deviation was 94 miles.
The minimum number of miles an Idaho patient traveled was
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134.1. The maximum was 311.3. The average number of miles 
an Idaho resident traveled was 178.6 and the standard 
deviation was 65.465.
How They Paid
The patients were asked to distinguish how they paid 
for at least part of their procedure. Their methods of 
payment included savings, credit card, help from a friend 
or family member, borrowing money "against" their car, pay 
check advance, a post-dated check, and pawning a 
possession. Over half of the clients paid for their 
abortions with savings. Thirty-three percent paid with 
help from friends or family. Almost 18% put at least a 
portion on their credit card. Approximately 11% specified 
other choices, half of which were taking out a loan. Three 
percent took an advance on their paycheck. The remaining 
options mentioned, borrowing against their car, post-dating 




The clients were provided possible reasons for 
deciding to have their abortion at Blue Mountain Clinic and 
were asked to value them on levels of importance, from very 
important to not important. Their choices were cost, 
availability, ease of scheduling, reputation, security, and 
privacy. Almost 74% of those surveyed indicated that 
privacy was very important in their decision. Sixty-two 
percent deemed the clinic's reputation as highly important. 
Availability was very important to 57% of the patients. 
Forty-six percent felt that the ease of scheduling was very 
important and 42% stated security.
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